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Every Federal election, The Climate Institute 
undertakes a qualitative assessment of the climate 
change policy position of political parties and 
independents represented in the Parliament. The 
Institute bases this assessment on our analysis of 
what is required for Australia to contribute to 
effective global climate change solutions and build a 
prosperous, resilient economy and society. 
This policy brief explains the rationale for our 2013 
Federal election policy tests.  
This Federal election is critical to Australia’s 
economic and climate future. The next Government 
will determine whether Australia will:  
1. Help or hinder global solutions to climate 
change: This will in large part be determined 
by our ability to meet international 
commitments to do our fair share to reduce 
global greenhouse gas emissions and help 
the poorest countries adapt to an 
increasingly hostile climate and invest in low 
carbon development pathways. Both of 
these elements will influence the positive or 
negative role Australia could play in current 
negotiations to finalise a global agreement in 
2015 that will cover emission commitments 
from all major economies.  
  
2. Continue the historic decline in domestic 
emissions and accelerate low carbon 
investment: Driven by global trends and 
domestic policies like renewable targets and 
carbon prices, pollution from some of 
Australia’s largest emission sources have 
begun to decline. Positive global trends in 
clean energy technology and increasing 
scrutiny of the risks associated with 
investments in high carbon assets are 
among the global mega-trends that leave 
our economy exposed in the real world of 
significant, if insufficient, action to price and 
constrain carbon emissions.    
 
3. Boost preparations for unavoidable 
extreme weather and other climate 
impacts: Agencies such as the World Bank, 
the IMF and the International Energy Agency 
are increasingly warning that climate change 
threatens to reverse gains made over 
decades of economic and social 
development. We no longer live in the 
relatively safe climate enjoyed by our 
ancestors. Even if we achieve more urgent 
and ambitious action now, our climate will 
get more hostile with the dangerous levels of 
greenhouse gases already in the 
atmosphere. How well we prepare for our 
increasingly unsafe climate will influence the 
health and wellbeing of Australians and our 
economic systems. It will determine the 
extent to which we can minimise the 
suffering of unavoidable impacts.   
Australia is faced with a challenge to manage the 
unavoidable and avoid the unmanageable. To be 
credible, let alone strong and effective, 2013 climate 
election policies will need to: 
 
1 Cut Carbon Pollution 
2 Accelerate Low Carbon Investments 
3 Prepare for Climate Impacts 
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“…climate change is real and 
there’s no point denying the 
consequences of a changing 
climate. We are living through 
climate change. We know it and 
we can see it… we’ve needed to 
take tough decisions like putting 
a price on carbon so we do seize 
the clean energy sources of the 
future”  
Julia Gillard Prime Minister 
ALP Candidates Conference
3 February 2013 
“… in the Coalition we believe 
now, as we did back in 2007, 
that climate change is real, that 
humanity does make a 
contribution and that you need 
a strong and effective policy to 
deal with it.”  
Tony Abbott Leader of the Opposition 
National Press Club
31 January 2013 
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Cut Carbon Pollution 
+ Can the policy achieve a net 25 per cent reduction 
in emissions below 2000 levels by 2020 and 
around a net 60 per cent reduction below 2000 
levels by 2030?  
 
+ Does the policy include immediate ratification of 
the second commitment period of the Kyoto 
Protocol and an independent domestic review 
mechanism to increase ambition of this target in 
2014? 
 
+ Does the policy include a plan to scale up public 
and private sector financing of poor developing 
nations each year to 2020, including a transparent 
public climate finance allocation of at least $350 
million in 2014–15? 
Accelerate low carbon investment 
+ Does the policy establish a clear long-term carbon 
price signal or penalty consistent with sustained 
structural adjustment from high emission to low 
emission technologies in major emitting sectors? 
 
+ Does the policy provide stability for renewable 
energy investment and ensure at least 41,000 GWh 
of large-scale renewable energy generation by 
2020? 
 
+ Does the policy include market mechanisms, 
regulations or incentives to boost 2010 energy 
productivity levels by 30 per cent by 2020?  
 
+ Does the policy require transparency from listed 
companies and institutional investors with respect 
to the emissions profile of their assets and/or 
portfolios, and their exposure to the physical, 
regulatory and other climate-related risks?  
 
Prepare for climate impacts 
+ Does the policy recognize the climate risks under 
2- and 4-degree warming scenarios? Are these 
climate risks being introduced into all appropriate 
national policies, standards, targets and oversight?  
 
+ Does the policy require private-sector proponents 
or owners of infrastructure—especially those 
seeking Commonwealth approval or funding—to 
disclose how their assets and interdependencies 
will manage climate risks under 2 and 4 degrees of 
warming?  
 
+ Does the policy establish the Commonwealth as a 
leader in climate risk management, in particular by 
(a) requiring all federal agencies to publish reports 
on their climate risk readiness 2 and 4 degrees 
warming scenarios; and (b) maintaining a national 
body with responsibility for the coordination and 
public sharing of adaptation research? 
 
 
 
 
  
Summary 
Policy Benchmarks 
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To avoid dangerous climate change the total amount 
of greenhouses gases, or carbon pollution, that can be 
released is finite. Only around 1,500 billion tonnes of 
greenhouse gases1  can be emitted to 2050 if we are to 
have reasonable chance of avoiding a 2oC increase in 
mean global temperature.2  
Recent extremes of weather demonstrate our 
vulnerability to even relatively small shifts in the global 
climate. Current average global temperatures are 
around 0.8oC above preindustrial levels and a 1.4oC is 
almost certainty locked into the climate system.  
Climate experts describe the effect of that warming as 
“putting our weather on steroids”; turning Australia’s 
already moody climate hostile.  Warming of above 2oC 
would exceed the adaptive capacity of many national 
and economic systems and take an ever-greater 
economic and social toll (Table 1). This is why the 
Australian Government has said it is in the national 
interest to avoid 2oC warming, and joined the United 
States, China and over 190 other countries in an 
international commitment to avoid this increase in 
mean global temperature. 
Both major political parties have committed to reduce 
emissions by 5–25 per cent of 2000 levels by 2020. 
Targets greater than the “unconditional” 5 per cent are 
defined by the level of international action. Both parties 
support avoiding a 2oC increase in global temperature 
and the ALP has also committed to reduce emissions 
by 80 per cent by 2050. 
Under the Government’s policy, the principal 
mechanism to achieve national targets is through a 
declining limit or cap on around 60 per cent of national 
emissions. Stronger limits than the default minimum 12 
million tonnes reduction per year may be implemented 
in 2015 following advice from the independent Climate 
Change Authority.  
 
The Coalition’s policy has no enforceable limit on 
pollution from major emitters but has a policy of 
unspecified penalties for pollution above “business as 
usual”.  
Based on the bipartisan minimum 2020 targets and the 
Government’s 2050 target, Australia’s total emissions 
(i.e. carbon budget) to 2050 would be around 15 billion 
tonnes.3 In a world limiting emissions consistent with 
avoiding a 2oC in global temperature, this would see 
Australians emit, on average, four times as much as 
others. If, on the other hand, the average Australian 
were to consume no more of the global carbon budget 
than the average person in other developed economies 
then, over the next 40 years, we can only release 
around 8 billion tonnes carbon pollution. At current 
emission levels this budget would be consumed in 
about 15 years.  
This illustrates a critical point: emission reduction 
requirements will not end in 2020. The post-2020 
legally binding agreement, which will cover 
commitments from all major emitters, is to be agreed in 
2015. Australia’s post-2020 targets will have to be 
stronger than its current 2020 ones.  
The Climate Institute and, separately,  Professor Ross 
Garnaut,4 have suggested that a fair contribution to 
avoiding a 2oC increase in mean global temperature 
requires Australia to reduce emissions by a net 25 per 
cent by 2020 and a net 60 per cent below 2000 levels 
by 2030.  
 
 
 
 
Cut  
Carbon  
Pollution 
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Table 1: The projected impacts of a 2- and 4-
degrees mean temperature rise on Australia 
(Adapted from Pearman (2009), report for the 
Treasury)5. Note that impacts will not occur in isolation 
and will interact. For example, loss of natural systems 
will impact on agriculture and infrastructure (e.g. loss 
of coastal protections provided by coral reefs and 
mangroves impacting on settlements and 
infrastructure). 
  
 Natural 
systems 
Water Coastal Agriculture Health Infrastructure International 
security 
2 degree 
world 
Significant 
loss of 
species, 
adaptive 
capacity 
exceeded 
Significant 
water 
shortages. 
Significant 
adaptation 
required to 
ensure 
that 
reliable 
supplies 
are 
maintained 
in major 
cities.  
Natural 
coping 
capacity 
exceeded. 
Loss of some 
coast 
developments 
due to 
coastal 
erosion and 
storm surges 
(in absence of 
sea walls).  
Reduced 
production 
Increase 
extreme 
events such 
as 
heatwaves 
and 
bushfires. 
Changes 
maybe within 
the coping 
capacity of 
public health 
services with 
additional 
expenditures. 
Coping 
capacity 
adequate 
(with 
investment) 
Increased 
demand for 
humanitarian 
aid and 
disaster 
response. 
Tens of 
millions 
threatened by 
coastal 
flooding. 
 
 
4 degree 
world 
(current 
minimum 
pathway) 
Massive 
loss of 
species 
Dangerous 
water 
shortages, 
adaptive 
capacity 
exceeded 
Massive 
consequence 
for coastlines, 
deglaciation 
of Greenland. 
Ability to 
meet 
Australian 
food 
demand 
stretched, 
adaptive 
capacity in 
serious 
doubt 
Major risks to 
human life.  
adaptive 
capacity in 
serious 
doubt 
Serious 
exposure to 
impacts, 
adaptive 
capacity in 
serious 
doubt 
Trade and 
monetary 
systems 
disrupted 
impeding 
development. 
Increased aid 
needed as 
social order 
breaks down 
in some 
regions. 
Hundreds of 
millions 
threatened by 
coastal 
flooding. 
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Australia’s commitments should include the use of 
international trading to cost-effectively meet our 
contribution to global action. While domestic 
transformation is critical (see next section), without 
international trading our contribution to global emission 
reductions would almost certainly be diminished and 
the costs of achieving emission commitments would 
increase. 
Policy benchmark. Can the policy achieve a net 
25 per cent reduction in emissions below 2000 
levels by 2020 and around a net 60 per cent 
reduction below 2000 levels by 2030?  
Under the Kyoto Protocol, the Australian Government, 
supported by the Opposition, has also taken on a 
second minimum legally binding commitment to 
constrain emissions between 2013 and 2020. The 
process of ratification is underway but cannot be 
formally completed until after the election.   
Australia also agreed to review the reduction targets in 
this commitment in 2014 with a view to increasing 
ambition up to the equivalent of a 25 per cent 
reduction by 2020. This timetable coincides with the 
release of a report by the independent Climate Change 
Authority on Australia’s emission targets and budgets, 
and setting of the emissions cap under the domestic 
carbon laws.  
Policy benchmark. Does the policy include 
immediate ratification of the second commitment 
period of the Kyoto Protocol and an independent 
domestic review mechanism to increase ambition 
of this target in 2014? 
Australia’s contribution to avoiding dangerous climate 
change does not stop with reducing emissions. It is in 
Australia’s national interest to contribute its fair share 
to public and private sector climate financing. Climate 
change poses a substantive threat to peace and 
security in the Asia-Pacific region and worldwide.6 
Climate finance facilitates adaptation within 
neighbouring developing countries, many of which are 
among the most vulnerable to climate change. Climate 
finance also builds confidence that developed nations 
will honour the commitments they have made. This is 
necessary to build support for the legally binding 
global agreement to be agreed in 2015. Finally, finance 
can help overcome the many barriers that exist to 
private sector investment in low carbon technologies in 
poorer nations. 
 
Along with other industrialized countries, Australia has 
committed to the global goal to scale up finance for 
climate mitigation and adaptation in developing 
countries: to US$100 billion a year from public and 
private funds by 2020. Private and innovative funds 
could be based on the carbon markets, removal of 
fossil fuel subsidies and emission levies on 
international shipping and aviation.  
 
At the Doha climate talks last year, it was agreed that 
industrialised nations would prepare a strategy to 
make this goal a reality. This will be the subject of a 
Ministerial Roundtable at the Warsaw UN climate talks 
starting 11 November 2013. Australia’s allocation to 
international public sector international climate finance 
over the period 2010–2012 was $599 million.7 
Based on our share of global emissions and the size of 
our economy, studies have calculated Australia’s fair 
share of global climate finance at between 2 and 4 per 
cent.8 To build on the good investment over the 2010-
2012 period and demonstrate a trajectory consistent in 
scale with Australia’s fair share of international climate 
finance commitments, it is essential that Australia’s 
next allocation of funding for climate finance be no less 
than $350 million per annum for the next four years.  
Policy benchmark. Does the policy include a 
plan to scale up public and private sector 
financing of poor developing nations each year to 
2020, including a transparent public climate 
finance allocation of at least $350  
million in 2014–15? 
 
Cutting carbon pollution policy benchmarks: 
1. Can the policy achieve a net 25 per cent 
reduction in emissions below 2000 levels by 
2020 and around a net 60 per cent reduction 
below 2000 levels by 2030?  
 
2. Does the policy include immediate 
ratification of the second commitment 
period of the Kyoto Protocol and an 
independent domestic review mechanism to 
increase ambition of this target in 2014? 
 
3. Does the policy include a plan to scale up 
public and private sector financing of poor 
developing nations each year to 2020, 
including a transparent public climate 
finance allocation of at least $350 million in 
2014–15?  
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Australia has not been well prepared to remain 
competitive in a world moving into a low-carbon era. 
Our nation’s highly polluting power sector, economic 
dependence on emission-intensive exports, inefficient 
use of energy, and extraction of natural capital will 
become economic liabilities as the world moves to limit 
carbon and related pollution. 
The global boom in clean energy investment in recent 
years has already reduced the cost of renewable 
energy here and abroad. While the precise future value 
of global carbon prices is obviously uncertain, prices 
will inevitably climb requiring our industries and 
economy to manage long-term exposures to higher 
global carbon liabilities. Changing patterns in the trade 
in energy commodities also means we are not isolated 
from global trends. For example, existing policies and 
those being developed are expected to cut global coal 
demand by 20 per cent by 2020.9 The investment 
community and Central Banks are increasingly looking 
to the financial and economic the risks of high carbon 
investments.10  
In short, the transition to a low-carbon global economy 
is unavoidable. The competitiveness of carbon-
intensive economies depends on the degree to which 
they can adapt to this new reality.11  
The combination of the carbon pricing, the Renewable 
Energy Target (RET) and energy efficiency measures is 
having an impact on Australia’s emissions profile. 
These policies are contributing to a decline in 
electricity demand and an even steeper decline in 
electricity emissions, by increasing the 
competitiveness of renewables and gas generators at 
the expense of coal generation.12   
A carbon price or a pollution penalty makes 
businesses take responsibility for their emissions and 
rewards those who invest in efficiency, clean energy 
and other low pollution options.  
 
Alongside other policies such as the Carbon Farming 
Initiative, the price ensures Australia will reduce its 
economic dependence on pollution by making new 
clean technologies relatively cheaper. 
In some cases, a portion of the price will be passed on 
to consumers and energy users. Experience shows 
that, over time, this will encourage behavioural change 
and lead to lower emissions.13  
Carbon pricing can also be used to raise revenue for 
investments in low pollution options that will not be 
strongly supported by carbon pricing, support a fair 
transition to the low carbon economy (e.g. through 
support low income groups) and help drive global 
climate solutions (e.g. carbon markets and climate 
finance). To illustrate, in the current carbon package, 
substantial carbon revenues are directed towards 
supporting clean energy, energy efficiency and building 
low carbon solutions in regional Australia. 
Table 2 outlines the results of recent independent 
assessment of the impact of long-term carbon pricing 
in Australia. Broadly speaking, these studies indicate 
that, in combination with the RET, carbon prices in the 
order of $30/tonne by 2020 and $60/tonne by 2030 
would lead to significant and sustained restructuring of 
the economy generally and the electricity sector in 
particular. They also indicate that the removal of 
carbon pricing would substantially increase emissions 
from the power sector in the short term as the most 
emission-intensive power sources become regain 
competitiveness compared to cleaner sources of 
electricity. 
If policies like the RET are removed or weakened the 
carbon price will have to be raised substantially to 
achieve the required economic transformation.  If the 
carbon price is removed policies like the RET and 
others will have to be significantly increased to meet 
target commitments. 
Accelerate  
Low-Carbon 
Investment 
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Table 2: Carbon prices and their impact on the 
transformation of the Australian economy.14 
 
The Government’s current policy is that Australia’s 
carbon price will be strongly linked to global carbon 
markets15, in particular in Europe. Current forecasts 
suggest this will deliver carbon prices averaging 
around $10/tonne (range $3.40-$16.60) over the period 
to 202016 and up to $39/tonne at that time.17  The 
Coalition includes an unspecified carbon penalty for 
companies that exceed unspecified emission baselines 
in its policy.  The size and forward trajectory of the 
penalty, how baselines are set and potential the role of  
 
 
 
 
 
offsetting mechanisms will be critical to its impact on 
low carbon investments. 
Policy benchmark. Does the policy establish a 
clear long-term carbon price signal or penalty 
consistent with sustained structural adjustment 
from high emission to low emission technology in 
major emitting sectors? 
 Carbon price 
assumption (2020) 
Carbon Price 
assumption (2030) 
Structure and emission impact 
Treasury (2011) 
(Real $2010, Economy 
wide modelling, 
modelling extends to 
2050) 
 
$29/tonne $53/tonne 8 per cent reduction in the emission intensity 
of the economy in 2020 (46 per cent 
reduction in 2050) 
$62/tonne $112/tonne 20 per cent reduction in the emission 
intensity of the economy in 2020 (68 per cent 
reduction in 2050) 
Climate Change 
Authority/SKM MMA 
(2012) 
(Real $2012, Electricity 
sector only including 
existing RET) 
$13/tonne $55/tonne Brown coal generation declines over the 
longer term. 
$31/tonne $55/tonne Brown coal generation declines over the 
longer term. Reduction in emissions of 12 
million tonnes below scenario with lower 
carbon price. 
$0/tonne $0/tonne Little renewable generation development 
post 2020. Increase in emissions of 134 
million tonnes above scenario with carbon 
price. 
RepuTex (2013) 
(Assumes removal of 
carbon pricing 
mechanism as per 
Coalition policy. 
Electricity sector only) 
$0/tonne N/A Natural gas generation falls by over 60 per 
cent by 2020. Total share of brown coal 
generation remains around 24 per cent rather 
than declining. Carbon emissions grow by 4 
per cent instead of falling by around the same 
amount to 2020 due to reduced brown coal 
output. 
University of NSW 
(2013) 
(Assesses least cost 
options for supplying the 
Australian National 
Electricity Market with 
100 per cent renewable 
electricity) 
N/A $0-$100/tonne At moderate carbon prices of around $50–
$65/tonne a 100 per cent renewable electricity 
system would be cheaper on an annual basis 
than a fossil-fuel-based system. 
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Over the last decade Australian industry and business 
have experienced a climate and energy policy 
environment of continuous disruption. This has been 
particularly difficult and costly for the energy sector, 
the long-lived assets of which demand a reasonable 
degree of policy predictability.   
For example, while the Renewable Energy Target has 
helped to fuel investment of $10 billion in renewable 
energy since 2009, and has the potential to drive 
additional investment of $19 billion by 2020, repeated 
reviews and amendments to the scheme have resulted 
in stop-start industry development.   
Further uncertainty and/or changes to the scheme to 
2020 would damage the viability and competitiveness 
of Australia’s emerging clean energy industry. Reduced 
early investment in renewable energy generation also 
risks higher electricity costs to consumers, who have 
to pay for extra fuel and carbon costs, as well as for 
the costs of uncertainty expressed as higher risk 
premiums.18  
In line with the recommendations of the independent 
Climate Change Authority (that the cost outweighed 
the benefits of changing the RET), the ALP’s policy is 
to keep the current 41,000 GWh large-scale target and 
remove the legislated 2014 review of the scheme. The 
Coalition has not yet stated its support for the 41,000 
GWh large-scale renewable energy target and stated it 
will review the level of target again in 2014. Without 
bipartisan support for the 41,000 GWh target and the 
removal of the 2014 review, renewable energy 
investment in Australia will remain stalled until 2015 at 
least. 
 
Policy benchmark. Does the policy provide 
stability for renewable energy investment and 
ensure at least 41,000 GWh of large-scale 
renewable energy generation by 2020? 
Energy plays a significant role in the economy as a 
major factor in production. The efficient use of energy 
can therefore contribute positively to economic 
growth. Energy productivity, which is defined as GDP 
per unit of energy used, has increased over time for 
many countries and is higher in countries which 
appreciate the benefits of extracting as much 
economic value from every unit of energy used. 
Overall, the failure to maximize our energy productivity 
imposes needless costs throughout the economy and 
reduces Australian competitiveness. Decoupling  
 
productivity from energy consumption becomes even 
more important in a world limiting pollution: it reduces 
emissions from existing polluting energy sources and 
reduces the amount of clean energy investment 
needed to achieve climate goals.   
Energy efficiency is a key driver of energy productivity. 
However, Australia’s approach to energy saving is 
patchy, and our energy efficiency is not improving at 
rates similar to comparable economies. For example, 
analysis by ABARES found that over the period 1990 
to 2004, energy efficiency improvements contributed 
to improved energy productivity by 0.4 per cent per 
year, around half that of in the United States and 
Canada.19  
 
Analysis by ClimateWorks of data provided by energy 
users that represent around 50 per cent of Australia’s 
total energy consumption found that industry has 
identified energy savings worth around $3.3 billion per 
year. Most of these investments would pay for 
themselves in less than two years. However, less than 
half of the energy savings, worth $2.1 billion, are likely 
to be implemented, due to a range of institutional 
barriers that could be addressed by policy support. 20 
Similar results have been found in the residential and 
commercial sectors.21  
 
Alongside carbon pricing, a range of policies are 
needed to make a step-change in Australian energy 
productivity. Important flagship policies include a 
nationally consistent energy savings initiative with a 
strong national target and ‘top runner’22 minimum 
energy performance standards for appliances and 
vehicles. Neither a national energy efficiency target or 
policies that could achieve a step change in energy 
efficiency are currently supported by either major 
party. 
 
Policy Benchmark. Does the policy include 
market mechanisms, regulations or incentives to 
boost 2010 energy productivity levels by 30 per 
cent by 2020?  
To prevent global temperatures from rising more than 
2°C, there is a finite amount of fossil fuels that can be 
burnt.  In the absence of carbon capture and storage 
technologies, this global carbon ‘budget’ is a mere 20 - 
40 per cent of fossil fuel reserves on the books of 
listed companies. 23  
If as little as 20 per cent of known fossil fuel reserves 
have economic value, there will be a significant 
negative impact on the value of companies and their 
investors. Australian analysis based on this approach  
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reveals much of the investment in Australian coal rests 
on a similar speculative bubble (see Figure 1 below).24 
Greater transparency of companies and fiduciary 
investors, such as superannuation funds, is required to 
enable informed investment decisions. 
At the company level, little carbon-related data was 
even understood before the advent of the Carbon 
Disclosure Project in 2003 that asked the world’s 
largest companies to provide information on their 
emissions and emissions reduction strategy. 
Legislation is growing rapidly worldwide to force 
companies to disclose their emissions and this is 
already in place in Australia. However, there is very 
little information regarding the emissions potential of 
the fossil fuel reserves and resources held by 
companies.  
Given the clear materiality of carbon and climate 
change related information to many businesses, 
especially capital-intensive ones exposed to inevitable 
carbon regulation over coming decades, a clear policy 
on reporting guidelines in this area to assist companies 
in their desire to keep the market informed of relevant 
information is required. This would include the 
emissions and emissions reductions strategies but also 
the emission potential of reserves and resources and 
carbon price assumptions used in their assessment of 
ongoing capital expenditure. 
Many companies are already aware of the material risk 
to their business that climate change represents, but 
have failed to disclose this information to the market. 
In the absence of clear guidance, many companies will 
continue to withhold this information. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Policy benchmark. Does the policy require 
transparency from listed companies and 
institutional investors with respect to the 
emissions profile of their assets and/or portfolios, 
and their exposure to physical, regulatory and 
other climate-related risks? 
 
Accelerating low carbon transformation policy 
benchmarks: 
1. Does the policy establish a clear long-term 
carbon price signal or penalty consistent 
with sustained structural adjustment from 
high emission to low emission technology in 
major emitting sectors? 
 
2. Does the policy provide stability for 
renewable energy investment and ensure at 
least 41,000 GWh of large-scale renewable 
energy generation by 2020? 
 
3. Does the policy include market 
mechanisms, regulations or incentives to 
boost 2010 energy productivity levels by 30 
per cent by 2020?  
 
4. Does the policy require transparency from 
listed companies and institutional investors 
with respect to the emissions profile of their 
assets and/or portfolios, and their exposure 
to the physical, regulatory and other 
climate-related risks?  
 
 
  
Figure 1. Australian coal 
against the global coal budget. 
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Australia’s climate is already changing rapidly. 
Extremes of heat and rainfall have risen in frequency 
and intensity over the last several decades, bushfire 
weather is worsening, southern Australia is becoming 
drier, and sea levels continue to rise.  
Such is the momentum of change brought about by 
elevated greenhouse gas concentrations that the 
global climate system will continue to warm for 
decades to come. While it is still technically and 
economically feasible to hold global warming to below 
2oC, current emissions trends put the world at risk of a 
rise in mean global temperature of around 4oC or more 
by 2100.  
To date, government and industry policy responses to 
emerging climate risks are mostly fragmented and rely 
on historical data that are decreasing in relevance and 
reliability. There is an urgent need to identify and 
address gaps in adaptation to minimize the risks to life, 
property, and prosperity. This might include an 
examination of planning systems and building codes. 
Given the risks span all spheres of national life, a 
joined up approach to adaptation policy is warranted.  
Policy benchmark. Does the policy recognize the 
climate risks under 2- and 4-degree warming 
scenarios? Are these climate risks being 
introduced into all appropriate national policies, 
standards, targets and oversight?  
However, 2oC is not a benchmark of safety to aim for 
with severe impacts projected. Should global warming 
exceed 2oC, the risk of irreversible, nonlinear, 
cascading impacts will rise (Table 1).  
 
 
 
 
The nation’s health and prosperity rest on the viability 
of existing infrastructure, as well as that of long-lived 
assets yet to come, in the face of an increasingly 
hostile climate.   
Modelling for the 2008 Garnaut Review conservatively 
estimated that the annual costs of unmitigated climate 
change on Australia’s infrastructure would reach 0.5 
per cent of GDP (about $9 billion) in 2020 and 1.2 per 
cent of GDP ($40 billion) in 2050.25 
Businesses can bring down the costs of climate 
change (public and private) by preparing well in 
advance and building their resilience. Currently, there 
is very little recognition by most infrastructure asset 
owners of the direct (let alone the indirect) risks in a 
warming world. CSIRO26 and other analysis by The 
Climate Institute have found that, at best, patchwork of 
responses is underway in key economic sectors (Table 
3). In particular where there is government financial or 
policy support for private development, enabling the 
market to take account of emerging climate risks 
means properly assessing and being transparent about 
those risks is important.  
Policy benchmark. Does the policy require 
private-sector proponents or owners of 
infrastructure—especially those seeking 
Commonwealth approval or funding—to disclose 
how their assets and interdependencies will 
manage climate risks under 2 and 4 degrees of 
warming?  
The Australian Government can further catalyse a step-
change in climate risk management, in other 
governments and in the private sector, by getting its 
own house in order. Progress ought to be subject to 
periodic review by the Australian National Audit Office.  
 
Prepare for  
Climate Impacts 
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With the loss of the National Climate Change 
Adaptation Research Facility there is a risk that years 
of research experience will be lost. There is a need for 
a national, properly funded authority charged with 
developing and coordinating a strategic approach to 
adaptation and resilience research; and ensuring new 
knowledge is freely available and taken up in relevant 
sectors. A priority is the identification of emerging 
climate risks for interdependent infrastructure assets 
and critical supply chains. 
Policy benchmark. Does the policy establish the 
Commonwealth as a leader in climate risk 
management, in particular by (a) requiring all 
federal agencies to publish reports on their 
climate risk readiness 2 and 4 degrees warming 
scenarios; and (b) maintain a national body with 
responsibility for the coordination and public 
sharing of adaptation research? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Preparing for climate impacts policy benchmarks: 
1. Does the policy recognize the climate risks 
under 2- and 4-degree warming scenarios? 
Are these climate risks being introduced 
into all appropriate national policies, 
standards, targets and oversight?  
 
2. Does the policy require private-sector 
proponents or owners of infrastructure—
especially those seeking Commonwealth 
approval or funding—to disclose how their 
assets and interdependencies will manage 
climate risks under 2 and 4 degrees of 
warming?  
 
3. Does the policy establish the 
Commonwealth as a leader in climate risk 
management, in particular by (a) requiring 
all federal agencies to publish reports on 
their climate risk readiness 2 and 4 degrees 
warming scenarios; and (b) maintain a 
national body with responsibility for the 
coordination and public sharing of 
adaptation research? 
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Table 3. Sector Snapshots. We have reviewed a
number of key industry sectors that deliver essential 
economic and social infrastructure and services 
across Australia. The following table summarises 
these findings.27
Sector Sample impacts Action underway Readiness rating
 
Water  
 
    
 
Systems stressed by 
flooding  
 
Supply risks for water 
users 
Coordinated action taking place  
 
Sector-wide collaboration on 
modelling impacts and responses 
 
Investigation of interdependencies 
with electricity and 
telecommunications 
 
Relatively 
advanced 
preparation 
 
Property 
 
  
Damage and 
destruction of property 
by flood, bushfire 
 
Degradation of 
foundations 
 
Impaired health and 
productivity    
Widespread examples of early 
action but uncoordinated at 
industry and government levels 
 
Regulation and planning suffers 
from gaps, inconsistency, conflict 
across and within jurisdictions 
 
Early preparation
Electricity 
 
    
Damage from flood/fire 
 
Strain/collapse in 
heatwaves  
 
Impaired health and 
productivity 
Action is at early stages 
 
Examples of cooperation among 
networks  
  
Regulatory framework an obstacle 
to action 
  
Underprepared
Road + Rail 
 
   
Flood-induced 
washouts 
 
Heat induced rail 
buckling, road cracking 
 
Impaired transportation 
of people and goods 
Action is at early stages 
 
Fragmentation of responsibility an 
obstacle 
 
Regulation and planning suffers 
from gaps, inconsistency across 
and within jurisdictions 
Underprepared
Financial 
Services 
 
   
Insurers directly 
exposed to increasing 
costs of extreme events 
 
Investors exposed to 
impacts on assets 
 
Action is at early stages 
 
Action not yet translated into 
market signals  
Underprepared
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